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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the role that culture plays in emotional 
intelligence, in people's ability to use emotions adaptively in their daily lives. 
Specifically, it presented existing cross-cultural research literature on emotional 
intelligence, with particular focus on the emotional competencies of Americans and 
Indians. The literature on cross-cultural psychology of emotions revealed cross-cultural 
similarities as well as differences in each phase of the emotion process. It supported the 
view that considerable universality existed with regards to perception of emotions in 
facial expressions, while the major sources of differences were detected in the processes 
of regulation of emotion and in certain appraisal propensities. Implications of these 
cultural variations were discussed with regards to the role of emotional intelligence in the 
diagnosis and treatment of psychopathology. 
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The Cultural Dimension of Emotional Intelligence and its Clinical Implications 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role that culture plays in emotional 
intelligence, in people's ability to use emotions adaptively in their daily lives. 
Specifically, it will present the existing research literature on people's capacity to 
perceive and identify emotions in others and in themselves, to incorporate emotions into 
their thinking, to understand the role and value of emotions in their lives, and to manage 
their emotions and use them for their personal development. Particular focus will be 
made on research literature that has examined the emotional competencies of Americans 
and Indians. The thesis will then discuss the implications of these cultural variations in 
the diagnosis and treatment of psychopathology in American and Indian cultures. 
Emotional Intelligence Competencies 
In this section, I will present existing literature that describes the origins and 
evolution of the concept of emotional intelligence (EI). Further, I will look at the specific 
competencies that underlie the broader construct of EI and how they are measured 
Emotion is one of the most central and pervasive aspects of human experience. 
Most people experience a wide range of emotions in their daily lives, from the quiet 
satisfaction of completing a relatively mundane task to the overpowering grief at the 
death of a near one (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Emotions also have many facets. 
They involve feelings and experience, they involve physiology and behavior, and they 
involve conceptualizations and cognitions (Ortony, et al.). 
Historically, emotion has often been delegated to the back seat, for emotion has 
been considered as an inferior component of human nature (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, 
& Mayer, 2000; Mayer, 2002). In his description of the historical basis of the philosophy 
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of emotions, Solomon (2000) describes how ancient Greek and Stoic philosophers 
considered the wisdom of reason to hold the reins while emotion consisted of dangerous 
impulses that needed to be suppressed or safely channeled to exist in harmony with 
reason. The Greek philosopher Aristotle, in his book The Rhetoric, defined emotions 
thus: "Let the emotions be all those things on account of which people change and differ 
with regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example 
anger, pity, and fear, and all other such things and their opposites" (Aristotle, trans. 
1954). Thus, emotions commonly conveyed the idea of irrational passions that had the 
power to sway judgment (Planalp & Fitness, 1999). 
Emotions: Physiological and Cognitive Components 
Scientific theory and research during most of the twentieth century continued to 
ignore emotions (Manstead, Frijda, & Fisher, 2004). This situation changed dramatically 
in the latter part of the century when there grew an enormous interest in emotion research 
within a multitude of disciplines including psychology, biology, sociology, anthropology, 
philosophy, neuroscience and cognitive science. New insights followed research, and a 
wide range of research gave rise to multiple theories and conceptualizations. Emotions 
have been examined and defined in terms of their disruptive/motivational intraorganismic 
functions by some psychologists, in terms of interpersonal and institutional functions by 
sociologists, and in terms of societal functions and cultural differences by anthropologists 
(Ekman & Scherer, 1984). Biological views have focused on the autonomic, central 
nervous and neuro-endocrine substrates of emotion, and have defined emotions and 
emotional experiences as the result of myriad physiological mechanisms and processes. 
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Appraisal and arousal theories ofemotion. Earlier cognitive approaches focused 
mainly on the notion that emotion consists of arousal and appraisal (Ortony et aI., 1988). 
Proponents of the arousal theory (e.g., Schachter, 1964) believed that in any emotion 
there is diffuse sympathetic discharge or autonomic arousal, and the individual's 
perceptions of the situation in which the arousal occurred determines how the emotion 
comes to be identified in the future. Schachter and Singer (1962) gave an experimental 
group an injection of epinephrine and the control group a saline placebo (on pretense of 
testing vitamins). Epinephrine mimics autonomic arousal in that it increases heart rate, 
respiration and systolic blood pressure. Of the group that had been administered 
epinephrine, some were informed of the true side effects while the others were left 
uninformed. They were then taken to a room where a confederate involved them in a 
series of playful activities. Those who had been given the epinephrine (and who hence 
felt aroused) but were unaware of the possible side-effects were significantly more 
euphoric than the placebo and informed groups. They felt that their arousal was due to 
their involvement in joyful activities. However, researchers like Lazarus (1970) did not 
concur with the view that all emotions produce the same kind of physiological response, 
thus proposing a second general cognitive approach. He contended that arousal is 
contingent on appraisal or how one interprets a stressful situation. For instance, fear is an 
emotional reaction that is the result of an appraisal of a threat, while anger is often the 
result of an appraisal of infringement. Thus, while researchers like Lazarus recognized 
the importance of cognitive processes in emotion, they believed that emotions depended 
on appraisals of situations and that arousal followed (Strongman, 1973). 
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The cognitive approach of appraisal offers a tantalizing view into the causal 
mechanisms involved in emotions. Indeed, what emerges at the core of all these theories 
is the awareness that all emotions presuppose certain sorts of cognitions. Irrespective of 
what neurobiologists say about the physiology of emotions or behaviorist views about 
expressions and bodily actions involved in emotions, there is a growing recognition of the 
fact that if a person is demonstrably ignorant of a certain state ofaffairs or facts, he or she 
cannot have certain emotions (Solomon, 2000). 
Processing theory ofemotion. It is essential to point out that to claim emotions 
always involve some degree of cognition is not the same as asserting that the contribution 
of cognition is always necessarily conscious (Ortony et aI., 1988). In fact, the cognitive 
approach has found some degree of opposition from views that suggest that an emotional 
response can be aroused automatically. Some researchers have demonstrated that 
elementary stimuli or fragmentary information, below the level of cognitive awareness 
can suffice to elicit some basic emotional reactions (Manstead et aI., 2004). 
A dominant approach to making sense of these two seemingly paradoxical 
approaches is to look at how our experience of the world is shaped through 'emotional 
structures' (Planalp & Fitness, 1999). Emotional structures, referred to as 'first-order 
knowledge', are the schematic memories of emotional episodes that are automatically 
reactivated when similar situations are encountered, resulting in the production of a 
feeling (Levy, 1984). These schemata or tacit emotional understanding of the world 
operate outside the realm of our conscious cognition and are often experienced as 'gut 
level' feelings about stimuli and people (Planalp & Fitness, 1999). For instance, a child 
with only one nurturing caregiver is more likely to experience initial episodes of 
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temporary separations from the caregiver as a dangerous loss, as compared to another 
child who was cared for by a number of nurturing people. The first child is likely to 
develop a schema about losses of loved ones in life, and will unconsciously react to them 
more vigorously and negatively than the second child. On the other hand, second-order 
knowledge refers to our abstract understandings of various emotions and how they work. 
According to anthropologist R. I. Levy (1984), the first-order knowledge leads to 
an appraisal, which in turn mobilizes the 'second-order knowledge.' This second-order 
knowledge about emotions is available to conscious awareness. It refers to a culturally­
influenced system consisting of evaluation of functions of emotions, their relationship to 
values and how to deal with these emotions. Based on his anthropological studies of the 
nature and function of emotions in a small Tahitian village, Levy gives an example of 
second-order knowledge by drawing on the same concept of loss. According to him, a 
Tahitian who experiences the loss of something he cared for 'knows' that he has 
undergone a loss as a result of his initial appraisal or first-order knowledge of emotions. 
However, in accordance with the cultural schemata that shape his second-order 
knowledge, such a loss is often experienced as an illness or the harmful effects of a spirit. 
Thus in the above example, a child with an ingrained emotional schema about loss is 
subjected to various elements in his cultural and environmental milieu (for instance, 
caregivers, teachers, peers, etc.) that will shape his emotional experience of loss in the 
future. 
Other researchers (Leventhal, 1984) have envisioned first-order knowledge as 
similar to schematic processing and second-order knowledge as a form of conceptual 
processing. Again, schematic processing is rapid and automatic, and does not involve 
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reasoning. These emotional schemata are considered to be tightly integrated structures 
consisting of eliciting situations, subjective feelings, and expressive and autonomic 
feelings (Leventhal). Repeated exposures to specific types of emotionally-provocative 
situations become blended into an average prototypic experience. For instance, repeated 
exposure to loving encounters with a parent will develop into an emotional schema 
wherein the smiling face of a parent evokes a perceptual memory ofpositive feeling and 
its associated facial expression and autonomic feeling. On the other hand, conceptual 
processing is voluntary and effortful, wherein an individual consciously reviews and 
reflects upon the various aspects of his or her emotional experience and develops 
conceptual memory structures about the emotional episode. These structures are drawn 
upon to be used in later emotional situations and reactions and playa crucial role in the 
formation of conceptual codes for the performance and control ofemotional reactions. 
Thus, conceptual processing or second-order knowledge of emotions tells us where to 
look, how to act, which objects to approach and which people to engage in emotionally­
provocative situations. 
Emotional Intelligence: How Competent We Are in Processing and Using Emotions 
Adaptively 
According to Planalp & Fitness (1999, p. 741), simply "acquiring and 
strategically using emotion knowledge is one thing; using such knowledge adaptively and 
wisely - particularly within the context ofpersonal relationships- is another." Other 
psychologists have proposed that understanding our emotions and those of others is the 
key to a satisfying life, with those who are self-aware and sensitive managing their lives 
gracefully and well even under adverse conditions, while the "emotionally illiterate" find 
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their lives full of misunderstandings, frustrations and failed relationships (Matthews, 
Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). Individuals are more likely to find happiness and fulfillment 
in their lives if they have better awareness and control of not only their own emotions, 
but also of others. Organizations and even society in general are more likely Jo benefit 
from individuals who perceive emotions in selves and others and use them as signals in 
self-understanding and management of others. This growing cognizance of the role of 
emotional processes in intelligent behavior has fuelled the growth of the domain that is 
now commonly referred to as 'emotional intelligence' (EI). 
The origins ofemotional intelligence. The notion of emotional intelligence stems 
from the generally prevalent idea that there are different types of intelligence. One type 
of intelligence is social intelligence, which E.L. Thorndike originally distinguished from 
the other forms of intelligence by defining it as "the ability to understand men and 
women, boys and girls - to act wisely in human relations" (1920, p. 228). In essence, 
Thorndike defined social intelligence as the ability to perceive one's own and others' 
internal states, motives, and behaviors, and to act towards them optimally on the basis of 
that information (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Then Howard Gardner (1983) introduced the 
idea of multiple intelligences which included both interpersonal intelligence (the capacity 
to understand the intentions, motivations and desires of other people) and intrapersonal 
intelligence (the capacity to understand one's feelings, fears and motivations). 
The first published use of the term emotional intelligence is attributed to Peter 
Salovey and John Mayer (1990). Referring to emotional intelligence as a subset of 
Thorndike's social intelligence and Gardner's personal intelligences, they defined it as 
"the ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, to discriminate 
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among them, and to use this information to guide one's thinking and action"(p. 189). 
However, what catapulted the meteoric rise of the concept in the public mind was the 
international best-seller, "Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than IQ" 
(1995) authored by Daniel Goleman (Daus, 2006), a psychologist and former New York 
Times reporter. Propounding EI as an intelligence that anyone can have, and in equal 
measure, Goleman (1995, p. 34) defined it as "abilities such as being able to motivate 
oneself and persist in the face of frustrations; to control impulse and delay gratification; 
to regulate one's moods and keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to 
empathize and to hope." 
Current definitions ofemotional intelligence. Since its rapid rise to fame, there 
have been many definitions of emotional intelligence and many claims made about it. In 
fact, Salovey and Mayer themselves revised their definition on the grounds that they 
found their earlier definition to be impoverished in that it omitted any reference to 
thinking about feelings. Their new and current definition is as follows: 
Emotional intelligence involves the ability to perceive accurately, 
appraise, and express emotion; the ability to access and/or generate 
feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion 
and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote 
emotional and intellectual growth (Mayer & Salovey, 1997, p. 10). 
The field of emotional intelligence is dominated by a multitude ofarguments 
about the concept, terminology, and operationalization. Emotional intelligence is either 
thought of as a set of abilities, a set of traits or a mixed set of both abilities and traits. 
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Emotional Intelligence as a Set ofAbilities 
The proponents of 'ability EI' have visualized the construct as a form of 
intelligence and "intelligence is classically defined as a group ofmental abilities that rise 
and fall more or less together" (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000, p. 329). Further, they 
believe that ability testing is the gold standard in intelligence research, because 
intelligence corresponds to the actual capacity to perform well at mental tasks, and not 
just one's beliefs about those capabilities. 
The primary model. The primary model for 'ability' or performance-based EI is 
the hierarchical four-branch model proposed by Mayer and Salovey (1997). Within this 
framework, EI is defined as a set of information-processing abilities or skills that are 
further classified into four branches of the model. Skills in the lower branches like 
perceiving and expressing emotions are essential precursors for the higher, more 
integrated processes like the conscious regulation of emotions (Mayer & Salovey). 
Competencies included in the model. Branch 1 of the model, 'Perception, 
Appraisal and Expression of Emotion' refers to the accuracy with which individuals can 
perceive emotions and emotional c<;mtent. A mature individual can correctly identify and 
monitor his internal feelings. For instance, if an adult who is staying up late is asked how 
she is feeling, she might respond that she is partly tired, partly still full of energy, and 
anxious about whether or not her thinking is still clear. Additionally this recognition of 
one's internal feelings can be imaginatively generalized from oneself to others, with the 
implication that an emotionally mature individual is able to perceive and evaluate 
emotion wherever it is expressed, be it in themselves, other individuals, or in artwork. For 
instance, an individual who recognizes the connection between his own constricted 
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posture and himself undergoing stress might be able to recognize anxious expressions in 
other individuals, animals and even objects by observing their constricted postures. 
Along with the identification and perception of emotions, Branch I also includes the 
ability to express emotions through various communication channels like facial 
expressions or voices (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). 
Branch 2, 'Emotional Facilitation ofThinking' , refers to the ability to use 
emotions and emotional events in intellectual processing. It recognizes the functionality 
of emotions, the role that emotions play in shaping and improving thinking by directing a 
person's attention to important changes. Branch 2 also includes the ability to 'generate 
emotion on demand'. For instance, when asked "How does the character in a story feel" 
or "How does this other person feel in this situation," an individual may generate the 
feelings within himself so as to put himself in the other's place. Such an individual can 
anticipate how entering a new school, taking a new job, or encountering a social criticism 
might feel. Being able to anticipate such feelings helps a person decide on a future course 
of action or planning ahead (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). 
Branch 3 of the model, 'Understanding and Analyzing Emotions', incorporates 
the ability to understand emotions. Beginning from childhood, an individual learns to 
understand the differences and similarities between different emotions, how emotions are 
linked to situations (for instance, the relation between loss and sadness when a child's 
best friend stops playing with her), and how the same circumstance can provoke 
complex, contradictory emotions, e.g. a child learns that it is possible to both love and 
hate the same person (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Another central component of this 
branch is the ability to reason about the progression of feelings in interpersonal 
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relationships (Mayer & Salovey). It involves the understanding that emotions tend to 
occur in patterned chains. For instance, a person's anger may intensify to rage, be 
expressed and then transform to satisfaction or guilt, depending on the circumstances. 
Management of Emotions is the highest branch of the model (Mayer, Caruso, & 
Salovey, 2000; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). This involves the conscious regulation of 
emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth. Emotional regulation enables an 
individual to be open to his feelings, both pleasant and unpleasant, and learn how to 
engage and disengage from emotions when appropriate. For instance, rage against an 
injustice may be ajustified response. However, an emotionally mature person learns to 
draw back from a situation when the rage is at its peak and discuss it with more cool­
headed confidants. But later on, the individual might draw on that same emotion to elicit 
others' anger in opposition to the said injustice, thus facilitating appropriate action. 
Additionally, an individual is able to progress beyond mere feeling of an emotion to the 
stage where he consciously reflects on his emotional responses (referred to as meta­
evaluation), and effectively regulates them (meta-regulation). TIlUS the meta-evaluation 
ofmood involves how much attention one pays to one's mood, and how typical, clear, 
acceptable or influential one's mood is. The meta-regulation part then is about regulating 
the mood, either by enhancing the pleasant emotions, dampening or avoiding 
exaggeration of the negative ones or simply leaving things alone (Mayer & Salovey). The 
internal regulation of one's own emotional state, and the manipulation of the environment 
to regulate one's own, and other people's emotions, depends extensively on the skills of 
the other branches, i.e. the accurate perception, expression, generation, and understanding 
of emotions (MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2004). 
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Measuring the competencies. Mayer, Salovey and Caruso's measure of emotional 
intelligence utilizes comprehensive aptitude-type tests that assess the skills outlined in 
their model ofEI (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 2000). The latest version of their 
measure is the MSCEIT (Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test- Version 2) 
and features performance-based tasks. For instance, the tasks designed to assess 
Perception of Emotion (Branch I) require participants to view photographs of faces and 
to identify the emotions in them. An example of a Branch 2 (Use of Emotion to Facilitate 
Thought) task would be to ask a participant to imagine what mood might be helpful when 
generating a large number of new ideas in a group? They are then given a list of five 
moods (e.g., sadness, surprise, jealousy, etc.) and are asked to indicate how useful each of 
these moods is likely to be on a five-point scale. The third branch (Understanding of 
Emotion) is measured by tasks that test a person's ability to analyze complex emotions 
and the progression of emotions. An example of a task from this branch might require the 
participant to choose the most appropriate response for a statement that says 
"Acceptance, joy and warmth often combine to form ...." Finally, the fourth branch 
(Management of Emotion) uses tasks like asking participants to decide how effective 
different courses of action would be in a short story about another person and his 
emotions (Bracket & Salovey, 2004). The authors claim that the scale scores have good 
internal consistencies (ranging from .81 to .89), while the correlation coefficient for the 
MSCEIT and measures for personality is said to be a low .38 (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 
2004), the implication being that the MSCEIT is actually measuring something other than 
personality. 
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Limitations ofthe measure. Although the developers of the MSCEIT have 
modeled their measure after traditional ability measures of intelligence, the biggest 
problem is that of scoring. Unlike a test of IQ in which there are fixed answers, it is 
difficult to come up with one right answer in emotional situations. The developers of the 
MSCEIT have attempted to tackle this situation by introducing two forms of scoring, 
consensus scoring and expert scoring. The emotional intelligence of a response is 
assessed with respect either to the group consensus or to the correct response identified 
by experts (a group of21 scholars and researchers on emotion) (Mayer, Salovey & 
Caruso, 2004). The rationale for using expert scoring is that psychologists versed in EI 
can set the standards. However the solutions to a child's emotional problems can vary, 
depending on the viewpoint and expertise of the professional who is providing the 
answer. Secondly, it is possible that the views of this pool of experts might reflect a 
cultural consensus rather than special expertise (Matthews, et aI., 2002) 
The justification for using consensus scoring is the view that the pooled response 
of a large normative sample is accurate. While that may be true, the problem here is 
discriminating among the most emotionally intelligent people (VanRooy, Visweswaran, 
& Pluta, 2005). Critics argue that most people might pick a simple and feasible solution 
to an emotionally laden situation, when in reality a different response might be the ideal 
one. In such a case, a person with a higher EI might be discriminated against on the test 
as his answer would not conform to the consensus response. Additionally, although the 
authors of the MSCEIT claim to have used a diverse sample of respondents from around 
36 countries, the fact remains that the consensus group consisted of 57.9% whites, with 
1240 participants from the United States and only 194 from India (Mayer, Salovey, 
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Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). This obviously raises concerns about the validity of 
consensus judgments that cross cultural boundaries (Matthews et aI., 2002). 
Critics of the ability measures also argue that measures like the MSCEIT test 
knowledge of emotions but not necessarily the ability to perform tasks that are related to 
the knowledge that is assessed. For instance, a person may know the correct answer to a 
question about the appropriate response to the grief ofa bereaved person, but that does 
not guarantee that such a person is actually skilled in performing the task of comforting a 
bereaved person (Brody, 2004). 
Emotional Processing Competency as a Set ofTraits 
The concept of 'trait EI' was propounded by Petrides & Furnham (2001) who 
believe that a theoretical construct should be named according to what it measures. 
Petrides and Furnham (2000, 2001) suggest that while performance based measures 
assess "ability Ef', self-report methods or informant reports commonly measure what 
they refer to as "trait E1" - behavioral dispositions and self-perceived abilities with 
regards to emotional intelligence. Thus, the authors proposed a differentiation between 
trait EI and ability EI, wherein the former is measured through self-reports and the latter 
through performance measures. 
The primary model. Based on their own analysis of the existing peer-research on 
EI, Petrides & Furnham (2001) concluded that a lot of the 'traits' that the self-reports 
measured (for instance, empathy, assertiveness, optimism on Bar-On's Emotional 
Quotient Inventory or EQi, empathy and assertivenss on Goleman's Emotional 
Competence Inventory or ECI, and so forth) were basically studied as personality traits, 
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thus strengthening their stand that trait EI should primarily be studied under the 
personality framework. 
The competencies included in the model. According to the 'Trait EI' model, an 
emotionally intelligent person is likely to be capable of superior emotion appraisal, 
expression, management and regulation, in addition to exhibiting other broader 
competencies like adaptibility, assertiveness, self-esteem, trait empathy, etc. It appears 
that what these researchers are suggesting is a different approach to study EI altogether, 
one that can be studied within the domain of personality. In fact, they have even 
suggested an alternative name for their conceptualisation of the construct -'emotional 
self-efficacy.' However, they decided to refer to it as 'trait EI' in their work so as to link 
it clearly "to the extant literature on EI ...." (Petrides & Furnham, 2001, p. 427). 
Measuring the competencies. The Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire 
(TEIQue) is a self-report measure that was specifically designed to measure the construct 
of trait EI comprehensively and is currently available in 15 languages. The TEIQue 
provides an operationalization for Petrides and colleagues' model that conceptualizes EI 
in terms of personality and the authors clearly distinguish it from other existing measures 
by remarking that" the TEIQue is a scientific measurement instrument based exclusively 
on trait EI theory. Trait EI theory is unrelated to what lay people understand by 
"emotional intelligence" or "EQ" and incompatible with other models of the construct" 
(petrides, 2008, Background section). The test includes 15 subscales organized under 
four factors: Well-Being, Self-Control, Emotionality, and Sociability. The sub-scales are: 
Adaptability, Assertiveness, Emotion perception (self and others), Emotion expression, 
Emotion management (others), Emotion regulation, Impulsiveness (low), Relationships, 
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Self-esteem, Self-motivation, Social awareness, Stress management, Trait empathy, Trait 
happiness & Trait optimism. Thus, according to this model, an emotionally intelligent 
person is one who is adaptable, assertive, low in impulsivity, motivated, socially aware, 
empathic, happy and optimistic in addition to being able to perceive and manage 
emotions in self and others, express emotions optimally and regulate his or her emotions. 
Limitations ofthe measure. As mentioned before, this measure is based on an 
entirely different view of our overall competency in emotional processing, one that views 
it as a set of personality traits, behavioral dispositions and self-perceived abilities. It 
naturally follows that researchers who support the notion that the competency in 
emotional processing should be viewed as an intelligence have criticized this approach. 
Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2000) are critical of other partly-overlapping definitions of 
emotional intelligence as they end up covering almost all of personality. 
Emotional Intelligence as a Mixed Set ofAbilities and Traits 
Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (2000) differentiated their 'ability model' from the 
other existing definitions of EI by referring to them as 'mixed models' that incorporate 
mental abilities in addition to a wide range of personality characteristics (e.g. EQi, ECI, 
etc). Thus, mixed models view EI as an inclusive set of traits that predict emotionally 
intelligent behavior but are not limited to intelligence or related forms of ability per se 
(MacCann et aI., 2004). 
The primary models. The theoretical framework underlying the mixed models is 
not as clearly demarcated, as there are many competing models (MacCann et aI., 2004). 
One of the most well-known models is the one proposed by Reuven Bar-On (2000) who 
defines emotional and social intelligences as 'a multifactorial array of emotional, 
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personal and social abilities that influence our overall ability to actively and effectively 
cope with daily demands and pressures" (p. 385). 
The competencies included in the model. Rather than a hierarchical set of abilities, 
the Bar-On model has five different dimensions of emotional and social competencies, 
namely, the Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, Adaptation, Stress management and General 
mood dimensions. These dimensions are composed of a set of lower -order EI facets 
(self-regard, emotional self-awareness, assertiveness, stress tolerance, impulse control, 
reality testing, flexibility, problem solving, empathy, and interpersonal relationship) as 
well as facilitators of these competencies (optimism, self-actualization, happiness, 
independence, social responsibility) (Bar-On, 2000). Thus, according to this model, a 
highly emotionally intelligent person is one who is emotionally self-aware, has high self­
regard and can tolerate stress well, is assertive but flexible, empathic, has good problem 
solving skills and successful inter-personally, in addition to being happy, optimistic, 
independent and socially responsible. 
Bar-On posits that EI develops over time and that it can be improved through 
training, programming, and therapy. He hypothesizes that those individuals with higher 
than average E.Q.'s are in general more successful in meeting environmental demands 
and pressures, while a deficiency in EI can mean a lack of success and the existence of 
emotional problems, especially among those individuals with deficits in reality testing, 
problem solving, stress tolerance, and impulse control. In general, Bar-On considers 
emotional intelligence and cognitive intelligence to contribute equally to a person's 
general intelligence, which then offers an indication of one's potential to succeed in life. 
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Measuring the competencies. Based on his conceptualization of competency in 
emotional processing, Bar-On developed the self-reported EQi (Emotional Quotient 
Inventory). It consists of 15 EI subscales that further define five higher-order dimensions, 
namely, the Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, Adaptation, Stress management and General 
mood dimensions (Bar On, 2000). Although researchers have acknowledged the 
thoroughness ofBar-an's research and the use oflarge, diverse samples in the 
development of the measure, they have commented on the close relationships between 
the EQi and other measures of personality like the Big-Five, and its poor convergence 
with the MEISIMSCEIT (Matthews et aI., 2002). 
It is interesting that Mayer ,Salovey and their colleagues who are now the 
strongest supporters of performance based scales to measure emotional intelligence, 
developed one of the earliest self-report measures of EI, based on their initial 
conceptualization of the construct. They referred to it as the Trait-Meta-Mood Scale 
(TMMS), consisting of 30-items which tap into people's beliefs about their aptitude to 
attend to their own mood states (Attention), their understanding of their own and others' 
feelings (Clarity) and their ability to engage in mood-repair (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, 
Turvey, & (1995). The items of this measure are straight-forward - for example, "I pay a 
lot of attention to how I feel" (Attention), "I can never tell how I feel" (Clarity - reverse 
scored), and "I try to think good thoughts no matter how I feel" (Repair). The authors 
later contended that the TMMS has its limitations as it only served to examine some of 
the emotional competencies that they outlined in their subsequent four-branch 
hierarchical model. However, they have continued to make use of it in research as a 
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measure of Perceived Emotional Intelligence or Trait EI (Femandez-Berrocal, Salovey, 
Vera, Extremera, & Ramos, 2005). 
The SREIs or Schutte Self -Reported Emotional Intelligence Scale was developed 
by Nicola Schutte (Schutte et aI., 1998). Although the measure is essentially a self-report, 
the developers claim that it is based on Salovey-Mayer's original model of emotional 
intelligence which consisted of the following three abilities: appraisal and expression of 
emotion, regulation of emotion and utilization of emotions in solving problems. The 
authors suggest that the scale measures a unitary factor that represents the homogenous 
construct of emotional intelligence. Further, they claimed that the scale showed good 
discriminant validity as the measure was not significantly related to four of the big five 
personality dimensions, other than openness to experience. In sum, the authors refer to it 
as a scale that "holds promise as a valid, reliable measure of emotional intelligence as 
conceptualized by Salovey and Mayer (p. 176)." 
Limitations ofthe measures. Researchers who believe emotional intelligence is 
actually a form of ability, including Salovey, Mayer and colleagues, have criticised the 
self-reports of EI on the grounds that such measures are open to bias, as people would 
naturally want to answer questions in a way that places them in a favorable light Thus, 
the view is that self-report measures are often not the actual portrayal of a person's 
behavior (Daus, 2006). 
Emotional Intelligence: An Ability, A Trait or Both? 
An overview of the different measures covered here will give the readers an idea 
that, while performance-based measures like the MSCEIT assess abilities like emotion 
perception, expression, understanding and regulation, self-report measures also claim to 
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measure most of these four areas in addition to certain behavioral dispositions or traits. In 
this basic difference in conceptualization lies the area of maximum contention. It is 
apparent that Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2004) view EI much like verbal or spatial 
intelligence, except that it operates on and with emotional content. There are many others 
who concur with this view and they believe that only maximum-performance tests 
measure ability EI (Barchard & Hakstian, 2004). The other prominent view is that 
emotional intelligence includes a considerable number of personality traits and hence 
better accessed through self-reports. Thus, a section of the literature on competency in 
emotional processing supports the notion that Ability EI and Trait EI may actually be two 
separate constructs that are distinctly related to cognitive abilities and personality 
respectively (Van Rooy et aI., 2005). 
Recent advances in the work of learning disabilities and education has encouraged 
some researchers to revisit their ideas of intelligence (Mayer, 2000). They now believe 
that cognitive intelligence should no longer be viewed as a single all-encompassing 
ability, but as a conglomeration ofmany small component processes. These intellectual 
skills are domain specific, meaning that competence in a process for one domain (e.g. 
planning an essay) does not necessarily imply competence in another domain (planning 
solution to a word problem). This view contradicts the implications of a hierarchical 
model ofEI as proposed by Mayer and Salovey (1997), wherein proficiency in the lower 
branches (emotion appraisal and expression) is a pre-requisite for proficiency in the 
higher branches (e.g., emotion regulation). On the other hand, it does support the so­
called mixed models which construe emotional ability as a group of competencies that 
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are closely related to each other, but do not require some of them to be a pre-requisite for 
the others. 
Intelligence is generally considered an ability, but most researchers also agree that 
intelligence is normally distributed in the population and that there is evidence that 
intelligence is genetically influenced. That supports the case that intelligence can be 
considered as a trait. However, the problem with conceptualizing emotional intelligence 
or any form of intelligence as a trait is that, by character, any trait is said to be stable over 
a long duration of time. However, one of the most exciting claims that have been made 
about emotional intelligence is that EI can be trained, and thus increased. This claim 
about EI would go against the conceptualization of EI as a trait, because researchers 
believe that deep, pervasive and lasting changes in personality are not really possible, 
though it might be possible to bring out certain superficial changes in attitudes and 
behaviors (Costa & Mc Crae, 1986). 
Amidst this argument about the actual construct of emotional intelligence, there is 
also the recognition that in spite of apparent differences in the different 'models' of EI, 
they are not mutually exclusive of each other (Petrides & Furnham, 2001; VanRooy et 
aI., 2005). Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso also concur that one way of viewing emotional 
intelligence is as a general ability-trait (2000). As mentioned before, their main problem 
with the other 'mixed' models is that the other partly-overlapping definitions of 
emotional intelligence end up covering almost all of personality. McCrae (2000) 
suggested that it would be more prudent to recognize that the processing of emotional 
information involves specific abilities as well as certain personality traits rather that 
continue to debate about whether EI is a disposition or a trait. It is interesting that this 
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idea of viewing emotional intelligence as more of a mixed construct straddling both 
worlds of intelligence and personality is slowly finding favor (Lyusin, 2006). 
Emotional Intelligence and Well-Being 
In this section, I will present existing research findings on the relationship 
between emotional intelligence and physical/psychological well-being and 
psychopathology. Does knowing how individuals fare on each of the specific EI 
competencies allow us to predict their physical health and psychological well-being? 
Additionally, how can this knowledge guide us in determining appropriate interventions? 
The novelty and popularity of the concept of Emotional Intelligence has triggered 
an ongoing spate of research into the relationship between EI and various areas of human 
functioning. Considerable research has been devoted to the role of EI in industrial and 
organizational psychology and the application of EI in school settings. In recent years, 
researchers have attempted to examine how people's ability to use emotions adaptively in 
their daily lives might influence their physical and psychological health. Salovey (2006) 
suggests that emotional intelligence is central to maintaining good health. He is not alone 
in thinking so. Other researchers concur that the perception, use, understanding and 
regulation of emotion in an adaptive manner may possible contribute to mental and 
physical health in numerous ways (Schutte, Malouff, Thorsteinsson, Bhullar, & Rooke, 
2007), and that there is a relationship between higher levels of EI and better physical and 
psychological health (Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2005). 
Trait EI has been found to predict happiness in one study of 112 female student 
participants in London (Chamorro-Premuzic, Bennett, & Furnham, 2007). In this study, 
trait EI (as measured by the TEIQue) was found to be positively correlated with 
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happiness (as measured by the Oxford Happiness Inventory), over and above personality 
traits like stability, extraversion, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. Other data 
suggest that adolescents of both genders who scored higher on their perceived abilities to 
understand and repair their emotions showed higher life satisfaction and lower perceived 
stress (Fernandez-Berrocal, Alcaide, Extremera, & Pizarro, 2006). In a similar vein, 
middle-aged women with higher scores on perceived emotional intelligence were seen to 
enjoy higher levels of psychological and social adjustment and fewer physical health 
problems (Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2002). It thus appears that the benefits of 
adaptive usage of emotions in daily lives on psychological well-being extend to all age 
groups. 
Implications for Diagnosing and Establishing Psychopathology 
Given that the competencies or skills included under the broad construct of 
emotional intelligence refer to adaptive usage of emotions in our daily lives, it is but 
natural that considerable research has been devoted to examining the relationship 
between EI and different mental disorders in which emotion plays a central role. In fact, 
Matthews, et al. (2002) are of the opinion that the implications of emotional intelligence 
should not be limited only to disorders where emotional states are a key feature such as 
anxiety and mood disorders. They should also extend to those where the emotional state 
per se is not prime, but where other qualities related to awareness and management of 
emotion might be more directly involved, as in impulse control disorders and personality 
disorders. For instance, Matthews, et al. (2002) suggest that low EI has been related to 
interpersonal difficulties due to lack of insight into others' feelings and intentions, and 
many personality disorders are often associated with difficulties in relating to others. 
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Research has substantiated links between EI and some of the disorders mentioned 
above. It was found that individuals who score lower on emotional clarity and individuals 
who perceive an inability to repair their emotional states as measured by the TMMS are 
more likely to report higher scores on measures like the Beck Depression Inventory 
(Fernandez-Berrocal et aI., 2005). Interestingly, higher scores for depression were also 
reported by individuals who scored higher on the Attention scale of the TMMS which 
evaluates how much attention an individual pays to his or her emotions. It might seem 
paradoxical that higher scores on what has essentially been touted as a component of 
emotional intelligence is correlated to psychopathology like depression. However, it 
appears that excessive self-focused attention or increased awareness of internally 
generated stimuli like emotions and cognitions is associated with negative affect in both 
clinical and non-clinical samples (Mor & Winquist, 2002). This might be because 
excessive attention to one's emotions or cognitions might actually lead to rumination. 
Rumination is described as passively and repetitively focusing on one's symptoms of 
distress and the circumstances surrounding those symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). In 
another study, the perceived ability to discriminate between different moods and feelings 
(as measured by the Clarity dimension on the TMMS) in a sample of middle-aged women 
was found to be positively correlated to their perceptions ofphysical and social 
functioning, mental health and vitality (Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2002). In the 
same study, the sample group's perceived ability to repair their emotional states was 
positively correlated to their perceptions of social functioning, mental health, vitality, and 
general health, in addition to being negatively correlated with bodily pain. Both these 
studies thus demonstrate that excessive attention to one's feelings may be associated with 
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negative states like depression, while the ability to understand one's feelings and actively 
regulate one's moods are more likely to result in a positive state of being, both physical 
as well as psychological. 
Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, and Mayer (1999) believe that different components 
of emotional intelligence are related to the coping process in response to stress. In an 
experiment, Salovey, Mayer, et aI., (1995) examined the relation of individual differences 
in beliefs about attention to, clarity, and regulation of feelings (as measured by the 
TMMS) to sustained negative affect and intensity and persistence of thought after being 
exposed to a distressing stimulus. In this study, 78 student volunteers were asked to see a 
film clip containing graphic footage of vehicle accidents and their aftermath. The 
subjects' moods were recorded after showing the clip, and they were asked to focus on 
and jot down their thoughts every 1-2 minutes for a total of 12 times, following which 
their moods were recorded again. It was seen that while overall participants reported 
negative moods initially after seeing the film clip, those individuals who reported being 
clear about their feelings on the TMMS were more likely to rebound from their initial 
mood drop. Additionally, analysis of the thought samples revealed that those individuals 
who reported being clear about their feelings showed a reduction in their negative 
thoughts over time; however those individuals who were not able to clearly distinguish 
their feelings continued to ruminate about the distressing event. 
Salovey, Bedell, et al. (1999) used the results of the above experiment to 
substantiate their hypothesis that clarity in discriminating feelings was important in the 
overall ability to repair one's mood and cope with a stressful event, while rumination 
usually hinders it. Additionally, they believe that there are two other skills that an 
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emotional intelligent person utilizes during the coping process - social support and 
emotional disclosure. They go on to suggest that how an individual chooses to repair 
one's mood state following a stressful event will ultimately determine the result of the 
coping process. They argue that emotional intelligence will predict which individuals are 
more likely to develop a healthy social network and engage in sharing their thoughts and 
feelings with friends and family, as well as engage in disclosure processes like personal 
writing (e.g., diaries, journals) as a means of successful and healthy coping after exposure 
to stressful events in their lives (Salovey, Bedell, et aI., 1999). Other researchers 
(Kokkonen, Pulkkinen, & Kinnunen, 2001) have substantiated the claims about the 
importance of our perceived ability to repair or regulate our own moods by demonstrating 
that individuals' active conscious attempts to tum a negative emotion into a more positive 
direction were responsible for lesser self-reported physical symptoms (e.g., pain, fatigue, 
gastrointestinal, cardiac and nervous symptoms). 
The above studies make it obvious that researchers are increasingly focusing on 
the links between individuals' ability to pay attention to and perceive, understand, and 
regulate their own moods and their physical and psychological health and well-being. 
This is not surprising given that a review of literature will reveal endless references to the 
links between deficits in different spheres of emotional competence and sychopathology. 
There is reason to believe that depression may be caused by a deficit in the ability to 
perceive emotional distress as a negative affect state and not merely a physiological state, 
by an inability to understand the cause behind the feeling, and by one or more deficits in 
ability to regulate the negative affect state through use of appropriate strategies (Garber, 
Braflaadt, & Zeman, 1991). In the light of different competencies that fall under the 
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emotional intelligence framework, it is now easy to see how depressed mood or negative 
affect might be related to excessive attention to one's emotions and cognitions or 
rumination, while more positive affect is related to increased clarity about one's feelings 
and the ability to regulate one's feelings using strategies like emotional disclosure or 
social sharing. 
Similarly, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) has also been conceptualized as a 
disorder with deficit in emotion regulation. One of the theories about GAD is that an 
individual who resorts to worry is using it to "trick" himself into believing that he or she 
is actually doing something about the situation on hand, instead of skillfully approaching, 
avoiding or reevaluating the problem (Rodebaugh & Heimberg, 2008). In other words, 
these authors hypothesize that people with GAD use worry to avoid negative affect and 
lack the ability to self-regulate their emotions. Very few studies have explicitly examined 
the link between EI and anxiety disorders, though there is some evidence to suggest that 
adolescents who report better ability to discriminate clearly among feelings and to 
regulate their emotional states (as measured by the TMMS) showed less anxiety as 
measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Fernandez-Berrocal, et aI., 2006). 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is another category ofpsychopathology 
that has been irrefutably linked to emotional dysregulation. BPD is a serious mental 
illness characterized by pervasive instability in moods, interpersonal relationships, self­
image, and behavior that often disrupts family and work life, long-term planning, and the 
individual's sense of self-identity (National Institute of Mental Health, 2001). 
"Behavioral patterns in BPD are functionally related to or are unavoidable consequences 
of this fundamental dysregulation of several, perhaps all, emotions, including both 
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positive and negative emotions" (Linehan, Cochran, & Kehrer, 2001, p. 480). Emotional 
dysregulation is considered the core of this pathology. In spite of this understanding 
about the disorder, there is little research that examines any direct links between BPD and 
emotional intelligence. One study (using lower and upper division psychology students at 
a Midwestern university as participants) that was designed to examine whether 
personality disorder symptomatology could be associated with emotional intelligence 
found that individuals who scored higher on the measure of borderline personality 
disorder reported lesser perceived ability to discriminate their own feelings (emotional 
Clarity) and lesser perceived ability to regulate their emotions (as measured by the Repair 
dimension on the TMMS) (Leible & Snell, 2004). Additionally, those individuals also 
reported lower scores on the dispositional tendency to pay attention to, to be concerned 
with and to be aware of other people's public reactions to one's private emotional 
experiences, as measured by dimensions on another scale (Multidimensional Emotional 
Awareness Questionnaire) used in the study. Together, it appears from this study that 
individuals with BPD score lower in various emotional competencies, ranging from 
deficits in their perceived ability to attend to others' emotions, to understanding and 
regulating their own emotions. 
As research progresses in these areas, it is expected that the links between various 
emotional competencies and how they influence the development and maintenance of 
different psychological disorders will become clearer. As some critics have pointed out, 
''the idea of pathologically low emotional intelligence would be more useful if EI theory 
specified a defined subset ofpathological processes that related directly to emotion­
regulation, and other pathological processes that do not" (Matthews, et aI., 2002, p. 411). 
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According to them, simply demonstrating that low emotional intelligence is positively 
correlated to depression or borderline personality disorder is not enough. 
Implications for Therapy 
It is essential to delineate the specific emotional competencies related with 
various psychological disorders for another vital reason. An analysis of how individuals 
differ in the various competencies that make up emotional intelligence can provide clues 
to effective counseling. Knowing where an individual falls short will give the therapist an 
idea about where to intervene. For instance, studies in naturalistic settings have shown 
that depressed individuals exhibit diminished expression ofpositive emotion, while 
evincing more frequent displays of negative emotion (Rottenberg & Vaughan, 2008). 
This is a finding that can be potentially related to the EI competencies involved in 
appraisal, perception and expression of emotions. Corroboration of this hypothesis will 
provide a direction to therapists who can collaborate with their clients on recognizing the 
role of emotion expression in their daily lives and how they are perceived by others 
around them. 
Analyses of how emotional competencies are differentially affected in disorders 
will assist in tailoring therapeutic interventions in other ways as well. A study conducted 
amongst Spanish high school students examined the relation ofmood regulation to 
symptoms of endogenous depression versus hopelessness depression (Williams, 
Femandez-Berrocal, Extremera, Diaz, & Joiner, 2004). Endogenous depression is a 
distinctive state of depression which is characterized by a lack of reactivity to the 
environment (Klein, 1974). The primary precipitating factor for this type ofdepression is 
linked to somatic or biological factors, and a precipitating life event is less likely to be 
Emotional Intelligence 35 
found before the onset of depressive symptoms (Lewinsohn, Zeis, Zeis, & Haller, 1977). 
On the other hand, hopelessness depression is defined as a subtype of depression for 
which the contributory cause is a negative attributional style combined with a 
precipitating negative life event (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). Williams and his 
colleagues (2004) found that the correlation between mood regulation skills (as measured 
by the Repair dimension on the TMMS) and endogenous depression was significantly 
smaller as compared to that between Repair and hopelessness depression. The authors go 
on to suggest that patients with clear endogenous symptom profiles are less likely to 
benefit from psychotherapeutics focused on mood regulation, as compared to others with 
non-endogenous symptom profiles. 
Many clinicians might claim that they have already been using knowledge of 
different competencies included in the EI framework to guide their work with clients. 
That in many ways is true. Some well-established modalities of therapy in the field 
already aim to inculcate at least some or most of the skills that are part of the EI 
framework. For instance, Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) which is widely used for 
individuals suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) targets the core 
emotional dysregulation that characterizes the condition, by teaching the client the skills 
needed to tolerate emotional experiences without engaging in extremes of affect or in 
behaviors that that worsen the situation (Koerner, 2006). Similarly, proponents of 
Cognitive-Behavior Therapy (CBT) claim that the cognitive therapist's work loosely 
resembles improving a client's EI (Matthews, et aI., 2002). These authors provide 
instances of how CBT might assist a client with social phobia who misperceives 
emotions, or when a client falsely appraises others as scornful, when a client with panic 
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disorder has a problem in understanding his emotions and mislabels his fear to a somatic 
source or when a depressed client shows poor management of emotions by withdrawing 
even further from his social support. 
Advocates of some other modalities of psychotherapy specifically refer to the 
skills or competencies that make for emotional intelligence, and aim to improve them 
during the course of therapy with clients. Emotions -Focused Couples Therapy (EFCT) is 
one such approach that focuses on the importance of emotional interactions in 
relationships. EFCT attempts to bring about positive change by encouraging couples to 
pay attention to emotions and emotional expressions and to become more aware of them, 
by correcting problems related to either emotional under or over regulation, reflecting on 
and gaining a better understanding of the emotional experience and finally transforming 
the maladaptive emotional responses (Goldman & Greenberg, 2006). 
From this section, we see how the concept of emotional intelligence or the various 
competencies that assist in adaptive usage of emotions in our daily lives can be 
successfully used to gain a better understanding of what fosters or hinders psychological 
health and well-being. While research is still in its initial stages in many of the areas and 
mostly only tentative links have been established between the various emotional 
competencies and psychopathology, it is clear that there exists enormous potential for 
future research that will establish and clarify these links beyond doubt. Doing so will also 
provide clinicians with substantial tools to provide more tailored interventions to their 
clients who suffer from difficulties in handling emotion in their daily lives. 
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Cultural Variations in Emotional Intelligence Competencies 
In this section, I will address the question "Does culture playa role in emotional 
intelligence?" I will focus on research findings on cultural variations in EI competencies 
(specifically between Indians and Americans) as well as on what explains these 
differences. 
As stated earlier, emotional intelligence has often been equated to other forms of 
cognitive intelligence (e.g., verbal or spatial intelligence). Whereas group differences in 
I.Q. on the basis of ethnic or cultural background has always been a controversial and 
sensitive issue, the role of culture in emotional intelligence still remains to be clearly 
established. While the influential role of culture in emotional intelligence has been 
readily accepted from the onset by some researchers (Fernandez-Berrocal et aI., 2005; 
Poon Teng Fatt & Chew Keng Howe, 2003), it must be mentioned that developers of one 
of the prominent EI theories claim that "EI theory is based upon basic emotions theory 
that views emotions as generally universal in nature, ..." (Caruso, 2008, p.14). 
Regardless of whether emotional intelligence is a form of cognitive ability or a 
personality trait, the fact remains that emotional intelligence incorporates the exhibition 
of some form of self-efficacy or competence in emotionally-laden situations. And it is 
extremely hard, or almost impossible to separate emotional competence from cultural 
context (Saarni, 1997). As stated before, a common view is that our experience of the 
world is shaped through 'emotional structures' (Planalp & Fitness, 1999). While these 
emotional structures or 'first order knowledge' lead to an appraisal and initial emotional 
reaction, our 'second-order knowledge' of emotions refers to our abstract understanding 
or evaluation ofthe functions of emotions, their relationship to values and how to deal 
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with these emotions. This is the part of emotional processing that is more accessible to 
consciousness (Levy, 1984) and thus to reflection and discussion. It is also likely to differ 
from culture to culture, nested as it is within a cultural framework. 
Cross-cultural Studies in Emotional Intelligence 
Bhattacharya, Dutta, & MandaI (2004) attempted to study the factor structure of 
EI in India, by developing a scale of items drawn from various sources as well as the 
Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale or the MEIS (the precursor to the current 
perfonnance based measure MSCEIT) and Schutte's EIS. These items were then judged 
by a team of experts who selected items based on the construct of Emotional Intelligence 
and the suitability of items in cultural context. This scale was then administered to a 
group of62 managers who were also administered Schutte's EIS, and the two scales 
demonstrated a correlation of .75. The items were then subjected to a factor analysis 
which revealed loadings on five main factors, namely appraisal ofnegative emotions, 
appraisal of positive emotions, interpersonal conflict & difficulties, interpersonal skills & 
flexibility and emotional facilitation & goal orientedness. The authors felt that in contrast 
to the items in Schutte's scale which are mostly self-referential, the newly developed 
scale contained items that described EI in reference to the self as well as in interpersonal 
context. They conclude that EI in a collectivistic country like India largely depends on 
the acceptability of an individual's behavior and emotional expressions in the socio­
cultural context. While the authors have made a valid point about the importance of 
cultural context, the process of selecting the initial items remains unclear. They have 
failed to mention all the different 'sources' from which the items were drawn, and the 
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theoretical background on which their construct of EI is based. Thus, it is difficult to give 
credence to their findings as the correct picture of EI in the Indian context. 
Another study by Pant and Prakash (2004) evaluated the construct of EI in India, 
as assessed by the MEIS (the precursor to the MSCEIT). They administered the MEIS to 
a sample of 60 participants, including graduate students and executives and compared the 
findings to the consensus scores used by Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso in 1999 for 
developing the MEIS. The overall mean scores for the individual tasks were similar for 
the sample and consensus groups. However, the reliabilities were definitely lower 
especially for the Faces task (Indian sample a= .31; Consensus a= .89) and the 
Managing Others (Indian sample a= .40; Consensus a= .72) task. The authors contend 
that the low reliability on the Faces task could be attributed to the unfamiliarity of 
American facial expressions to the Indian sample. However, this argument goes against 
the dominant finding of research on universal emotions, which suggests that basic 
emotions are universally recognized. The low reliabilities on the Managing Others task 
was attributed by the authors to the fact that the American vignettes were not culturally 
relevant to the Indian participants. Thus, this study demonstrated the limitations of using 
an ability based measure of EI that contains tasks that are not relevant to the cultural 
context of the participants. 
Sibia, Misra, and Srivasatava (2004) have argued that EI in the Indian context 
cannot be viewed as a homogenous trait or ability devoid of its associated social concerns 
or moral values, and that culture-specific ways of behaving are basic to the notion of EI. 
In their study that aimed to conceptualize the indigenous notion of EI in the Indian socio­
cultural context, 1047 participants, including parents, teachers and students from eight 
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different Indian cities described the emotional qualities desired by them in children and 
those required to be successful in life. The responses received primarily belonged to four 
major categories, namely pro-social values ("respecting elders," "being affectionate"), 
social sensitivity ("concern for others," "empathizing with others"& "control of negative 
emotions"), action tendencies ("being helpful"& "disciplined") and affective states 
("happy disposition"& "optimism"). The authors believe that their findings reveal how 
contemporary Indian society interprets EI differently from the Western view "which lays 
emphasis on hierarchical acquisition of abilities, which are clearly distinguishable from 
traits such as warmth, sociability, etc" (Sibia et aI., p. 121). Once again in this study, the 
authors address an extremely vital point about how cultural traditions and moral values 
provide a frame for emotional competencies; however the problem encountered here is 
akin to what Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000) felt about trait based definitions ofEI 
covering all of personality ultimately. 
In spite of the different approaches and hypotheses involved in the 
aforementioned studies, they all share one common feature: the recognition of how 
desirable emotional qualities in the Indian context reflect concerns, expressions and 
behaviors that are intertwined with the participants' relationships with others, rather than 
focusing solely on the self. It appears that the concept of emotional intelligence in the 
Indian context is not limited to a set of unique abilities that reside within an individual; 
instead it is more of a set of abilities and traits that are in tum influenced and modified by 
the context of the prevalent cultural ethos of society at large. 
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Factors that May Influence Emotional Processing Competence in the Indian Context 
Individualism-Collectivism. As the private self in India is more organized around 
'we', 'our' and 'us' (Sibia et al., 2004), India has often been referred to as a collectivistic 
culture, as opposed to the individualistic cultures of the West. Individualism-Collectivism 
was proposed by Hofstede (1991) as one of the dimensions along which countries are 
found to differ. Individualists view themselves as independent ofany group, are primarily 
motivated by their own preferences, needs and rights, while giving preference to their 
own goals over those of others (Triandis, 1995). Collectivists on the other hand, value 
harmony and group solidarity and are ready to give priority to the goals of others in their 
group over their own. As the collectivist self is seen as part of the group, there are 
heightened concerns about self-presentation and loss of face (Singh-Manoux & 
Finkenauer, 2001). 
Another way in which collectivist emotions highlight the interdependent self is 
that emotions are felt more intensely if the appraisals reflected that the situation was 
relevant to respectability, status, or in group respectability (Mesquita, 2001). Collectivist 
cultures are also characterized by a greater impulse to interact with the environment and 
change the relationship with the environment under emotional circumstances as 
compared to their individualistic counterparts (Mesquita). This could explain why 
collectivistic cultures are more open to social sharing or sharing their emotional 
experience with their family and friends (Singh-Manoux & Finkenauer, 2001). 
Masculinity-Femininity. However, the differences on emotional intelligence 
across cultures cannot always be attributed to differences in cultures along the 
dimensions ofIndividualism-Collectivism. One such study was carried out by Fernandez­
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Berrocal et al. (2005) to examine the influence of cultural factors on the relationship 
between perceived EI and depression. Participants from the U.S., Chile and Spain 
completed the Trait-Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS) and the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI). The cultural factors used in this study were Hofstede's dimensions of 
Individualism-Collectivism and Masculinity-Femininity, with U.S. being the 
individualistic, masculine culture and the other two countries being examples of more 
collectivistic, feminine cultures. So called 'masculine' cultures value competitiveness, 
assertiveness, ambition, and the accumulation of wealth and material possessions, 
whereas 'feminine' cultures place more value on relationships and quality oflife. Results 
showed that lower scores on Attention (perceived ability to attend to their own mood 
states) and higher scores on Clarity (understanding oftheir own and others' feelings) and 
Repair (ability to engage in mood-repair) on the TMMS were linked to lower scores on 
the BDI across cultures, as expected. However, contrary to expectations, the dimensions 
ofIndividualism-Collectivism did not moderate the relation between perceived emotional 
intelligence and depression. The dimension of Masculinity-Femininity played moderating 
role instead, as the relationship between higher Attention scores and higher BDI scores 
on one hand and higher Clarity scores and lower BDI scores on the other was more 
intense in the feminine cultures of Chile and Spain. The authors surmise that the results 
could be due to the greater emotional intensity associated with the feminine cultures. 
Indigenous theories ofemotion. Studies like the one mentioned above encourage 
researchers to examine other causes and attributions for the underlying differences in 
emotional processing across cultures. As mentioned before, emotion theorists have called 
for cultural/symbolic/meaning-centered approach to the study of emotions (Shweder & 
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Haidt, 2000). The idea behind doing this is that the emotional experience is construed 
differently across cultures (Mesquita, 2001). In fact, India is one of those countries which 
can claim to have its own ancient, indigenous theory of emotions (Menon, 2000). This 
theory was laid out in one of the chapters of the Natyashastra, a special text composed by 
Bharat in approximately the third century A.D. and devoted to a context of recreation and 
enjoyment through dramatics and poetry (Jain, 1994; Singh, 1999). 
The concept that is being referred to is known as rasa, which can be roughly 
translated as meta-emotion (Jain, 1994). Rasa refers to a transcendent state ofaesthetic 
experience, grounded in the day-to day acquisition ofthe ability to read others' moods 
through a long practice of inferring emotions from verbal and non-verbal clues and 
situational contexts (Singh, 1999). It naturally follows that rasa can be enjoyed through 
art forms like poetry, dance or drama which utilize situational cues and expressions of 
emotion. 
The Natyashastra mentions eight rasas (meta-emotions), each of which is 
produced by the joint interplay of related emotions (sthayibhava), related persons who 
are the objects of emotion (alambanbhava), the presence of contextual objects 
(vyabhicharibhava) and the expression of emotions (anubhava). For example, a 
performance that incorporates a beloved person, objects like garlands or flowers that 
signify that the characters are in love, and the use of gestures and expressions like shy 
glances, together bring the emotion of love into being. All this when presented on the 
stage, either through dance or drama, produces the rasa of sringar (eroticism) in the 
audience (Jain, 1994). 
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The Natyashastra basically tells us that the rasa are more like the union of three 
script-like components, namely the determinant or eliciting conditions (e.g., forced 
separation from a loved one or finding oneself powerless in a dangerous situation), 
consequences which could be somatic (e.g., sweating, fainting, weeping, etc.), action 
tendencies (e.g., abusing the body) and expressive modes (bodily movement, tone of 
voice or facial expressions), and 'accompanying mental states' (e.g., weariness, panic, 
shame etc., Shweder and Haidt, 2000). Ancient as this indigenous theory of emotions is, 
it clearly demonstrates that as opposed to irrational passions overpowering an individual, 
emotions arise from the intentional appraisal of objects in a given situation (Jain, 1994). 
Thus, in Hindu India, emotions are not considered to reside only in the inner recesses of 
the self (Menon, 2000); the emotional experience appears to be construed more on the 
basis of relational events rather than mere feelings. 
To sum it all, cultural salience is a theme that appears constantly in research and 
literature on EI in the Indian scenario (Thingujam, 2004). It is clear that although 
researchers in India recognize and accept the construct ofEmotional Intelligence 
(Thingujam), many of them have expressed the need for a more culturally-fair method of 
assessing and substantiating the construct, as the Indian society with its collectivistic 
values and inherent socialization according to an ancient theory of emotions may not be 
exactly comparable to the more 'self based West. In spite of fairly obvious differences in 
how the Indian and Western world views and values emotional processing, it is 
fascinating how the basic tenet of rasa theory about the appreciation of emotions in daily 
life, through individuals, objects and art forms finds validation and resonance in Mayer 
and Salovey's current model of emotional intelligence, wherein they imply that an 
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emotionally mature individual is able to perceive and evaluate emotion wherever it is 
expressed, be it in themselves, other individuals, or in artwork (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). 
Although Indian researchers have pointed out the fact that internalization of traditional 
philosophical thoughts by lay persons appear to guide their emotional experiences (Jain, 
1994), it is also clear that these indigenous Indian philosophies are not unique in their 
entirety but also share a commonality with modem-day Western concepts of emotional 
intelligence. 
Secondly, as Patterson (1996, p. 230), pointed out, " ... we are rapidly becoming 
one world, with rapid communication and increasing interrelations among persons from 
varying cultures, leading to increasing homogeneity and a worldview representing the 
common humanity that binds all humans together as species." It holds equally true for the 
contemporary Indian society, which is a society in transition, with noticeably changing 
trends in social institutions like marriage and family roles (Larson, Verma, & Dworkin, 
2001; Seth & Vohra, 1994) and in emerging individualistic values like preference for 
hedonism over duty to others (Seth & Vohra . 1994; Thingujam, 2004). 
In such a scenario, it would be interesting to look into the emotional lives ofmy 
countrymen, and compare them with those of the Western society. Unfortunately, there 
are very few studies that compare and contrast emotional processing competencies 
between Indian and other Western cultures. Shweder and Haidt (2000) assert that for the 
sake of comparison and translation, any "emotion' is decomposable into its narrative slots 
namely, somatic experiences (e.g., muscle tension, headaches), affective experiences 
(e.g., emptiness, pleasantness), antecedent conditions (e.g., infertility, job loss), self 
appraisal (e.g., irreplaceable loss, loss of fame), social appraisal (e.g., socially accepted or 
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deviant), self-management (e.g., attack, withdrawal etc) and expressions ( e.g., voice, 
posture and facial expressions). Hence, to know if people are alike or different in terms of 
their emotional functioning, it is necessary for researchers on emotion to decompose 
emotional scripts into their constituent elements and compare them to see where the 
similarities and differences lie (Menon, 2000). 
Cross-cultural Comparisons in Emotional Processing 
In the following section, I will describe cross-cultural research in emotional 
processing under two broad heads: on an individual's ability to perceive emotional 
information, to relate it to other sensations (such as color and taste), and to use it to 
facilitate thought and on the ability to understand emotional information and use it 
strategically for planning and self-management. 
Cross-cultural comparisons in the perception, appraisal and expression of 
emotion. The ability to perceive emotion has been widely studied in contemporary 
research on culture and emotion. Much of this research has focused on basic emotion 
theories which propose a limited and universal set of human emotions, which in turn are 
connected to specific facial expressions and particular patterns of physiology (Mesquita, 
2001). 
A well-known line of research in this area is the work on recognition of facial 
expressions of emotion across cultures. The model used in these studies usually requires 
respondents to associate a picture of a face showing a given expression with an emotion 
word from a list. An instance of this form of study is the one carried out by Haidt and 
Keltner (1999), in which they showed people in India and the U.S. 14 photographs of 
facial expressions, and simply asked them, "What has happened to make the person feel 
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this way?" The photos showed facial displays of anger, fear, happiness, sadness, disgust, 
surprise, contempt, amusement, embarrassment, shame, sympathy, and other exploratory 
emotions. Additionally, participants usually provided affect words when discussing the 
photos, of which the authors performed a free-response analysis. Results indicated that 
both samples showed good recognition of the basic emotions like anger, disgust, 
happiness, surprise, embarrassment, sadness, and fear, while there were some differences 
in others like shame and embarrassment. The U.S. sample consisting of undergraduate 
students at the University of Wisconsin-Madison performed better at distinguishing 
between shame and embarrassment as compared to the Indian sample, consisting of men 
and women, aged between 19-39 years, in a town in Orissa, India. The authors believe 
that this difference might be attributed to the Indian use of the common word lajya to 
refer to both emotions. 
Another interesting difference that was found was in the description of the 
situational antecedents of the different emotions. The anger expression, for example, 
elicited extremely high recognition rates in both cultures, while the situational analyses 
confirmed that the anger expression was usually the result of conflict, quarreling, or 
fighting, often between friends and family members. The difference was that most 
Wisconsin participants cited an offence or violation of the selfs rights committed by 
another person as the cause of the anger (e.g., being stood up by a friend, getting cut off 
in traffic, getting woken up at night, getting pinched). In the Indian sample, only four 
participants described an offense against the self, while most common causes of raga or 
anger were unpleasant social situations like conflicts, quarrelling or fighting between 
friends and family members. 
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According to the authors, anger in the U.S. sample thus seemed to evolve out of 
offences against the self, out of self-defensiveness, while in the Indian sample, anger was 
less individualistic and more about the status and health ofongoing relationships. 
Similarly, the happiness expression in U.S. elicited mainly stories about individuals who 
achieved their goals or achieved something they desired (e.g., an A on a test, ajob, a 
raise, a date). These situation-types were also found in the Indian sample; however they 
were outnumbered by situations describing reunions between friends and family. Thus, 
the happiness expression in the Indian context appeared to have less to do with personal 
fortune, and was more connected to the pleasure of social relationships. This increased 
focus on social relationships rather than on the ups and downs of their personal lives 
might be due to the collectivist culture in the Indian context, wherein emotions are felt 
more intensely if the appraisals reflected that the situation was relevant to respectability, 
status, or in group respectability (Mesquita, 2001). 
While most researchers have concentrated on using the set of basic emotions as 
outlined by Ekman (1972, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984) in their studies in recognition of 
facial expressions, a study was conducted to compare American and Indian recognition of 
the different emotional portrayals mentioned in an ancient Indian text, the Natyashastra, 
through the use of dynamic expressions using both face and body movements (Hejmadi, 
Davidson, & Rozin, 2000). No overall differences were noted between American and 
Indian students in the recognition of emotion on items requiring fixed responses from a 
list of given emotion words. However, on items with a free-response format, Indians were 
more accurate as compared to their American counterparts in recognizing lajya (Indian 
emotion akin to shame/embarrassment/shyness), heroism and peace, which might be 
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indicative of the greater salience of these indigenous categories or their lexical referents 
for the Indian culture. Thus, while there can be no arguing about the fact that there exists 
a certain degree of universality in the recognition and perception of emotions, one cannot 
deny the fact that cultural salience and context plays an important contributory role in the 
differences that exist in this area. 
Another important component of the emotional process deals with socially 
appropriate ways to express emotion (Menon, 2000). Also referred to as 'display rules' 
by researchers, "these are learned rules that dictate the management of emotional 
expressions based on social circumstances" (Matsumoto, Takeuchi, Andayani, 
Kouznetsova, & Krupp, 1998, p. 148). In a study (Matsumoto, 1993) directed at 
examining the differences in affect intensity, display-rule attitudes, self-reported 
emotional expression and emotional labeling between different ethnic groups in an 
American population, participants from four ethnic American groups (Caucasian, Asian, 
Black and Hispanic) were shown photos of faces showing the seven universal emotions. 
Participants were then asked to rate the appropriateness of the emotional situation in 
different social situations (e.g. alone, in public, with close friends etc.), and also to rate 
how frequently they themselves displayed these emotions. The author found that Blacks 
perceived greater intensity when judging emotions and reported greater frequency of 
anger expressions. Conversely, Asians were found to have consistently lower intensity 
judgment and display rules appropriateness ratings. In Matsumoto's opinion, the 
collective cultural norms that characterize the Asian groups lay emphasis on suppressing 
one's emotional reactions so as not to offend others in the group, thereby avoiding 
confrontation. These cultural nonns might be the basis for the members learning to 
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attribute less intensity to the emotions of others and to discourage overt expression of 
emotions, thus contributing to the observed differences in intensity ratings between them 
and the Caucasian, Hispanic and Black groups. What is interesting about this study is that 
though its aim was to examine cross-cultural differences in basic emotion display or 
expression of emotion, what probably contributed to the observed differences were 
actually differences in how emotions were regulated. Studies such as these lead me to 
question the hierarchical model of EI as proposed by Mayer-Salovey-Caruso, wherein 
expression of emotions paradoxically is placed on the lower-most branch. 
Another broad area of research that addresses one of the components of 
experiential EI is that of appraisal. Appraisal is basically a series of evaluations of a 
situation/stimulus on a number of dimensions, such as novelty, pleasantness etc. The 
assumption underlying appraisal research is that the emotional experience is contingent 
on appraisal (Mesquita, 2001). This same understanding resonates to a certain degree in 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso's model ofEI where the components of higher branches like 
understanding and regulating emotions are contingent on the components of lower 
branches, including appraisal. 
It then follows from the above assumption that initial appraisal predicts 
subsequent emotional experience, leading one to expect that cultural differences in 
appraisal would account for the differences in subsequent emotional experiences as well 
(Mesquita, 2001). This hypothesis led to cross-cultural studies like the one conducted by 
Roseman, Dhawan, Rettek, Naidu, and Thapa (1995) between Indian and American 
students to examine the appraisals that elicit particular emotions. In this study, both 
groups were shown cross-culturally validated photographs of faces showing sadness, fear 
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or anger and asked to remember a time that they felt similarly. After being asked to 
describe the experience, they answered questions related to their appraisals of the 
situation and emotional responses. Evidence showed that an appraisal of an event as 
being caused by circumstances led to emotions of sadness and fear, while appraisals that 
other people caused negative events triggered anger, rather than sadness or fear in both 
groups of students. 
In this study, similar appraisals led to similar emotions irrespective of culture. 
However, Indians were found to feel less intensity of sadness or fear than Americans in 
similar situations, as they appraised sadness, anger and fear- causing events as more 
motive-consistent or less discrepant from what they wanted (motivational state was 
judged by answers to items like "Did you want to maximize some benefit in this 
situation?" and "Was this event inconsistent with your desires?"). It appears that the 
tendency of the Indian participants to appraise events as more motive-consistent (less 
discrepant from what they wanted) accounted for their lower sadness and their lower 
anger. The basis for this emotional reaction can be attributed to the concept of sarna 
mentioned in the Natyashastra. Sarna (loosely translated as serenity/calmness) is a 
significant emotion in the Hindu culture that emphasizes the importance of transcendence 
and non-attachment (Haidt, 2003). On the contrary, American culture places great 
emphasis on outcomes. It is possible that how the participants in the study experienced 
emotions was influenced by different culturally-rooted philosophical orientations to 
actions and their outcomes (Roseman et aI., 1995). 
In summary, a review of relevant cross-cultural literature reveals that there is 
considerable pan-cultural consistency in how individuals perceive emotions in facial 
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expressions, except in cases where the emotion shown had more significance with respect 
to a particular culture. Similarities also exist in how individuals across different cultures 
appraise emotionally-laden situations. However, differences were evident in the 
respondents' emotional responses (display rules) to events across cultures and these often 
times reflect cultural differences in how these emotions are regulated. 
Cross-cultural comparisons in understanding, regulating and managing 
emotions. Although research in the universality of emotions and appraisals may form a 
significant part of the body of cross-cultural research, other researchers are of the opinion 
that appraisals and expression form only a part of our total emotional repertoire 
(Mesquita, 2001; Shweder & Haidt, 2000), and thus an examination of the interaction 
between culture and emotion perception, appraisal and expression will be inadequate. 
The influences ofculture go much beyond providing a lexicon for emotional experience 
or regulating display rules and socially acceptable or deviant patterns of emotional 
experience. Culture makes some feelings salient to our social selves (Kitmayer, 2001), 
and this role of culture in how we understand and regulate our emotions begins right from 
childhood, through the process of socialization. This usually occurs during the process of 
child-rearing, as cultural values which determine a community's beliefs and standards of 
behavior permeate caregiver behavior (Cole, Tamang, & Shreshtha, 2006). 
An instance of how culture and socialization influence the regulation of emotions 
can be found in the research of Cole et al. (2006). These authors refer to their study of 
two rural Nepali communities, the Tamangs and Brahmins, and give examples of how 
schoolchildren from the two communities react differently in the identical situations. For 
instance, in a situation where an adult spills a drink on homework which consequently 
Emotional Intelligence 53 
has to be redone, Brahmin children say that they are angry, but refuse to convey their 
anger to the adult who spilled the drink. On the contrary, Tamang children said they 
would feel 'ashamed' and not angry, as it was their fault that they had placed the drink 
there. The authors suggest that the differences in emotional reactions can be attributed to 
the differences in their socialization. Tamangs are followers of Buddhism, and their 
culture is dominated by concerns of modesty, humility and respect. On the other hand, 
Brahmins are high-caste Hindus who are considered the privileged class of society, and 
they often are proud of their learned status. Thus, while a Tamang child is socialized to 
feel shame instead of anger which is inconsistent with their cultural priorities, a Brahmin 
child's caregivers might socialize him such that anger is justified but its expression is not, 
as it conveys disrespect for elders. 
As stated before, second-order emotional knowledge is open to a wide range of 
cultural influences. In addition to caregivers, peers also form an important influence on 
how emotions are to be regulated. An instance of this can be found in the study 
conducted by Raval, Martini, & Raval (2007) in a sample of Gujarati children in India. 
The methodology involved reading the children separate vignettes conveying emotions of 
sadness, anger and physical pain. The children were then asked about how they would 
respond in similar situations, and how and why they would express/conceal their 
emotions in front of parents and peers. Results showed that these children overall 
perceived others to be less accepting of their feelings of anger and sadness, and hence 
would express physical pain more often than the other two. Even when they decided to 
express anger or sadness, they were more likely to do so using indirect means of 
expression like sitting quietly in a comer or facial expressions, rather than verbally 
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conveying it, as in case ofphysical pain. Additionally, these children reported controlling 
their feelings in front of their parents for fear ofbeing reprimanded or scolded, while they 
also reported doing so in front of their peers for fear of being ridiculed. This study shows 
how peers also serve a regulatory function in deciding the appropriateness of emotional 
behavior in different cultures. Again, the findings of this study reflect the collectivist 
nature of the Indian culture wherein the self is seen as part of the group, leading to 
heightened concerns about self-presentation and loss of face (Singh-Manoux & 
Finkenauer, 2001). 
Culture not only sets limits for expression of emotions, it also provides lay 
theories and strategies for managing strong emotions (Kirmayer, 2001). Multiple 
instances of this fact can be found in the work of researchers who have studied the 
phenomenon of somatization in depression cross-culturally (Bhui, Bhugra, Goldberg, 
Sauer, & Tylee, 2004; Conrad & Pacquio, 2005; Derasari & Shah, 1988). These studies 
reveal that Indian samples are more likely to report physical symptoms like physical 
aches and pains instead ofpsychological ones when facing emotional distress, as doing so 
is more in accordance with their cultural beliefs and behavioral standards. 
Socio-cultural norms influence the management of emotions in myriad other 
ways. One of those strategies is social sharing, or recounting and sharing of emotional 
experience by an individual with his socio-cultural environment. A study examined the 
phenomenon of social sharing ofthree emotions, namely fear, sadness and shame across 
adolescent samples from the Indian, immigrant Indian and English communities (Singh­
Manoux & Finkenauer, 2001). The exploratory study required the adolescents to fill out a 
questionnaire about the preceding situation for the three felt emotions, details of sharing 
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about the emotional experience, reactions of the sharing partner and the perceived benefit 
of sharing. Results indicated that as compared to the English, a greater proportion of both 
Indian and immigrant Indian participants shared more with their families, reported 
receiving more help/advice from their sharing partners and perceived sharing to be more 
beneficial in general. In contrast, the English group reported superficial sharing of only 
factual details, with detached responses from the sharing partner. The authors attributed 
this difference to the collectivistic, interdependent nature of the Indian groups, as 
compared to the English individualistic values of self-sufficiency and independence. 
Hence, culture influences the management and regulation of emotions in various ways. It 
provides acceptable modes of expression, determines which emotions should be revealed 
and which should be concealed, and even provides strategies for managing the intensity 
of emotions. 
It clearly emerges at this point that culture plays a significant role in how 
emotions are experienced, regulated and managed. The logical question that follows is if 
the underlying competencies show variation with culture, then is emotional intelligence 
itself a culture-bound phenomenon? Salovey asks this question himself (2005). He agrees 
that certain display rules for emotional expression might be culture-specific, but wonders 
if the underlying skills are really different. "We think, in general, that they are not, but we 
really do not know for sure" (Salovey, p.vi). On the contrary, Indian researchers have 
accepted the validity of emotional intelligence as a construct, but believe a more 
culturally-fair method of assessing and substantiating the construct is needed to do justice 
to its collectivistic 'self. 
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In essence, a review of literature on cross-cultural psychology of emotions will 
reveal cross-cultural similarities as well as differences in each phase of the emotion 
process (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Considerable universality exists with regards to 
perception of emotions as in facial expressions, while the major sources of differences lie 
in the processes of regulation of emotion (e.g. as captured through display rules, 
somatization, social sharing ,etc.) and in certain appraisal propensities. Also, cross­
cultural similarity or difference in one respect does not necessarily imply similarity or 
difference in other respects (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). It might be pertinent at this point 
to quote Alan Roland, who has written widely about his experiences drawn from doing 
clinical psychoanalytic work in the U.S., India and Japan-
I realized ... the very thrust of searching for universals of development, 
structuralization, and functioning results from the Western cognitive mode of 
universalistic, abstract thinking where the universal and the unique are elaborated, 
as contrasted to the Indian mode of abstraction where one is constantly thinking in 
terms of contexts (Roland, 1984, p. 572). 
Clinical Implications o/Cultural Variations in Emotional Intelligence Competencies 
In this section, I will consider the implications of these cultural variations in EI 
, competencies for the enhancement of psychological health and well-being in American 
\ 
and Indian cultures. 
Unfortunately, research on application of emotional intelligence in India has 
mostly been limited to the demonstrating the effectiveness ofEI in organizations (Khanna 
& Vohra, 2003: Singh & Woods, 2008), primarily using EI measures developed in the 
West. When it comes to examining how emotional intelligence might possibly impact 
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psychological health particularly in India, research is sparse. One study that was 
conducted in New Delhi, India, examined the relation between emotional intelligence and 
subjective well-being in a group of executives, and concluded that subjects with higher 
emotional intelligence scored significantly high on positive affect and low on negative 
affect, with higher scores for life satisfaction as well (Kulshreshtha & Sen, 2006). 
Implications for Establishing and Diagnosing Psychopathology 
With a dearth of research hindering any effort to support or make a claim about 
the connections between emotional intelligence and psychopathology in a cross- cultural 
setting, it would be appropriate to adopt a conceptual approach to the issue. For instance, 
let us consider depression. In our previous section, we have already reviewed some of the 
research that has demonstrated how individuals with deficits in the ability to regulate 
their own emotions are more likely to score higher on measures for depression. In fact, 
some of the stalwarts in the field of emotional intelligence believe that an emotionally 
intelligent individual is more likely to cope successfully with stressors through utilization 
of skills like lesser engagement in rumination, prompt emotional disclosure and increased 
use of social support (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 1999). On the other hand, 
our review of literature suggests that in Hindu India, emotions are not considered to 
reside only in the inner recesses of the self (Menon, 2000). That might lead us to 
speculate that Indians, like those from other collectivistic cultures ,are less likely to spend 
time focusing intensely on their inner experiences of emotion (Fernandez-Berrocal, 
Salovey, et aI., 2005). Additionally, Indian participants in studies on social sharing have 
been shown to share more and actively with their families, reported receiving more 
help/advice from their sharing partners and perceived sharing to be more beneficial in 
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general (Singh-Manoux & Finkenauer, 2001). Given this information, would it make 
sense to hypothesize that Indians, who in general appear to utilize most of the skills 
necessary for successful coping, are less likely to report negative affect as compared to 
their Western counterparts? Hardly, for statistics reveal otherwise. Health facility-based 
studies have been undertaken in different settings in India which include primary health 
centers, tertiary teaching hospitals, private psychiatric clinics or psychiatric outpatient 
departments. The proportion of cases reporting some kind of depressive symptoms range 
from 20% to 43% of all cases seen (Gururaj, Girish, & Isaac, 2005). 
What is interesting though when we do a cross-cultural comparison is that studies 
on depression have revealed that there is a higher frequency of somatic symptoms in the 
Indian population as compared to the American population (Derasari & Shah, 1988). This 
has often been attributed to the stigma and sense of shame associated with mental illness 
in the Indian culture (Chowdhury et aI., 2000). Somatization of symptoms is accepted by 
many counselors as expressions ofpsychological distress (Draguns, 1997). Why Indians 
show a predilection to express their psychological distress through somatic symptoms 
might be better understood from a psychodynamic line of reasoning as put forward by 
Roland (1984). He believes that the modes of cognition and ego functioning ofthe 
individualized self in India is highly contextual and oriented towards symbolicity and 
metaphorical expression, which might explain why physical symptoms like headaches 
come to the fore. On the other hand, the mode of cognition and ego-functioning in the 
U.S.A. is strongly oriented towards rationalism and self-reflection, which might explain 
the connection between increased rumination and depression as seen in some studies on 
U.S. subjects (Fernandez-Berrocal, Salovey, et al., 2005). 
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It is a possibility then that psychopathology like depression should not be viewed 
as a mere deficit in emotional competencies, but rather as a maladaptive usage of the 
emotional competencies in a cultural context. As mentioned before, the American self 
seeks to self-reflect when it comes to emotions. While this might prove to be an 
emotionally competent tool for most, some of them might engage in excessive self­
focused attention and get caught up in a ruminative style of coping. This then becomes 
maladaptive and can become counterproductive. In the Indian context, there is an 
environment of emotional connectedness and interdependence in hierarchical 
relationships, be it family or workplace. Often ambivalent or negative emotions are 
suppressed or denied, especially if they might disturb the harmony of the relationships 
(Roland, 1984). Obviously these norms for regulating emotions have been successfully 
utilized by most people in this cultural milieu. However, this strong emotional 
interconnectedness also opens up more avenues for hurt and anger, when the expectations 
for reciprocal understanding of emotions, attitudes and needs are not met. If the hurt and 
anger build up and cannot be handled by culturally prescribed strategies for emotion 
regulation like containment or suppression, psychopathology might result. 
Implications for Therapy 
An analytical study of the differences and similarities between the American and 
Indian population in their use of emotional competencies in their daily lives is important 
for several reasons. The number ofIndians in the United States has increased 
considerably over the last few years, and they now constitute a growing segment of 
American society, especially in urban areas (source: 
www.migrationinformation.org). 
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In such a scenario of steadily-increasing migration, the first concern is one of 
intercultural adjustment. Research has demonstrated that high emotion regulation is the 
most important predictor of positive inter-cultural adjustment (Matsumoto, Le Roux et 
aI., 2003). As the spectrum ofpresenting symptoms usually decides the diagnoses and 
ultimately the entire course of therapy, a better knowledge about how various cultural 
groups might broadly differ in their emotional competencies might prove to be of 
assistance to those clinicians who largely deal with a clinically diverse population. 
Then again, not only does emotional intelligence influence stress levels and 
psychological well-being, it also influences an individual's willingness to seek help from 
professional and non-professional sources (Ciarrochi & Deane, 200 I). Knowing how 
differences in emotional competencies may affect how different cultural groups view 
seeking help for psychological problems, early detection and preventive programs can be 
built with that in focus. 
Finally, an analysis of how individuals differ in emotional intelligence can 
provide clues to effective counseling. For instance, in Hindu India, emotions are not 
thought to reside in the innermost recesses of the self; hence the belief that introspection 
will not help one to recognize one's own emotions nor know oneself better (Menon, 
2000). In contrast, the essential component of the American selfrevolves around working 
out how one feels (Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004). One approach might be to utilize these 
cultural frameworks and to tailor therapy accordingly. Thus, American clients might 
benefit from therapies like Emotionally Focused Therapy (EFT) that focus on emotions, 
their accurate perception and appraisal, understanding the emotional experience and 
transforming the emotions. Similarly, Indian clients might be encouraged to follow 
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distinct ways of coping that are more culturally relevant, such as meditation and yoga 
(Laungani, 1996). These practices are likely to cater to the spiritualism inherent in the 
Indian belief system, which believes that the ultimate purpose ofhuman existence is to 
transcend one's physical existence and attain a heightened state of emotional awareness 
(Laungani, 2001) 
Another approach that might be considered in therapy is to broaden one's 
emotional competencies by learning to utilize some of the skills, which might not have 
been part of their inherent socio-culturallearning, but have been shown to be useful to 
others. Examples of this approach might be the increased use of techniques like 
mindfulness training in the Western world. Mindfulness has its roots in Buddhist -Zen 
philosophy, and essentially describes an alert mode ofperceiving all sensations, 
cognitions and affect with a warm, friendly, accepting and non-judgmental attitude 
(Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmuller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006). There are several 
definitions for the concept (Bishop et aI., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 2003), and several measures 
as well (Baer, 2007). Recent research has revealed that three elements of mindfulness 
have been shown to be especially helpful in improving psychological functioning; 
observing (the tendency to attend to internal and external experiences, such as sensations, 
emotions, sounds, sights and smells), non-judging a/inner experience (taking a non­
evaluative stance towards thoughts and feelings) and a non-reactivity to inner experience 
(the tendency to allow thoughts and feelings to come and go without getting caught up in 
them or carried away by them)(Baer, 2007). During mindfulness practice, individuals are 
asked to be aware of when their thoughts drift to the past or the future and to gently 
redirect their attention to the present moment experience (such as their breathing or 
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bodily sensations) (Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, & Laurenceau, 2007). Mindfulness 
practitioners learn to allow thoughts and feelings to come and go as they are, without 
necessarily responding to them or getting carried away by them (Baer, 2007). Thus, 
mindfulness training can help individuals suffering from psychopathology like 
depression, by encouraging them to observe their thoughts dispassionately, without 
getting absorbed in them or ruminating about them, and instead directing attention to 
present-moment experiences. 
On the other hand, therapists who are in tune with recent trends of psychotherapy 
in India have reported a growing interest in that country for therapy forms like 
Emotionally-Focused Therapy (EFT) (Rastogi, Natarajan, & Thomas, 2005). In this form 
of therapy, the key concept is to coach people in resolving conflicts in their intimate 
relationships by helping them realize and reveal their softer, core emotions like sadness, 
fear or shame underlying their secondary or defensive emotions like withdrawal, 
submission or anger (Goldman & Greenberg, 2006). This increasing focus on emotions 
and the true emotional experience becomes interesting in the light of what Roland (1984) 
has to say about the intense emotional connectedness of the family hierarchical 
relationships in India where there is "strong expectations for reciprocity and for the 
others to be highly empathically sensitive to one's feelings, moods, and needs without 
having to express them explicitly" (p. 579). He goes on to say that in order to maintain 
the relationships, any disruptive feelings are often" ... contained, inhibited or defended 
against through a variety of unconscious defense mechanisms..."(p. 580). It might be so 
that this growing demand for forms of therapy that coach the importance of accurate 
perception, understanding, expression and transformation of emotions reflects a growing 
Emotional Intelligence 63 
understanding that some of the culturally prescribed forms of regulating the self are 
contributing to conflicts in interpersonal relationships. 
Conclusion 
Emotions have fascinated humans since time immemorial, and the relationship 
between emotion and cognition has been widely researched. The concept of emotional 
intelligence or EI provides an exciting medium to look at the interrelatedness of emotion 
and cognition. Currently, there are multiple theories about how EI should be 
operationalized, and several instruments to measure it. While most of the research has 
been concentrated in the Western world, there has been some research conducted in other 
countries like India. However, a review ofliterature on cross-cultural studies ofEI and 
emotional competencies reveals that culture definitely influences the adaptive usage of 
emotions by individuals in their daily lives. While considerable universality exists with 
regards to perception of emotions in facial expressions, major sources of differences lie in 
the processes of regulation of emotion (e.g. as captured through display rules, 
somatization, social sharing, etc.). 
The applicability of EI has been more widely researched in the fields of 
organizational and school psychology than in others. However, there is also considerable 
interest in how emotional intelligence can influence mental health. High levels of 
emotional intelligence have been related to both physical and psychological well-being. 
On the other hand, evidence has been found that lower levels of emotional intelligence 
are related to depression, anxiety, personality disorders like borderline personality 
disorder, ineffective coping under stress, and poorer adjustment. A clear understanding of 
how the different emotional competencies included under the broader construct of EI 
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influence various psychopathological disorders will be helpful in planning specific 
treatment interventions. In this context, cross-cultural differences in emotional 
competencies also become relevant. While culture often plays an extremely influential 
role in the manifestation of psychopathology, it can facilitate the determination of 
appropriate interventions as well. 
Existing literature supports the notion that emotions are construed differently 
across cultures. While the Indian mode of cognition and action is highly contextualized, 
the more individualized West is focused on the self. When it comes to emotions, these 
subtle but basic differences might lead to cultural variations in regulation of emotions, in 
the stages of emotional processing that go beyond mere feeling of an emotion, to where 
an individual consciously reflects on hislher emotional responses (referred to as meta­
evaluation) and effectively regulates them (meta-regulation)(Mayer & Salovey, 1997). 
Therapy techniques like mindfulness training and emotion-focused therapy thus become 
extremely useful. They assist individuals of both cultures to pay attention to their mood, 
identitY how typical, clear, acceptable or influential their mood is and to regulate it, either 
by simply experiencing the mood as it is or by transforming it. 
As times change, the concept of the self expands and evolves, be it in India or 
America. This change is being brought about by the incorporation of paradigms from 
other cultures and by changes that are occurring in their own cultural principles (Roland, 
1984). There is a growing awareness that both Eastern and Western psychotherapies can 
benefit from the integration of paradigms, and what might appear 'culturally incongruent' 
at times, might even bring 'relief (Van Hoecke, 2006). Thus, the concept of emotional 
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intelligence and its cultural variations deepen our understanding of psychopathology and 
treatment, making them more relevant and meaningful to the individual in question. 
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